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The U.S. manufacturing sector has become
the poster child of the jobless recovery,
portrayed by columnists and politicians 
as the latest victim of the Bubble Economy.
Manufacturing employment has fallen 
2.6 million since the last recession began 
in March 2001, accounting for the lion’s
share of the 2.7 million decline in payroll
employment from March 2001 to its trough
in August 2003.The overall decline in manu-
facturing employment has actually been
even larger, 3.0 million, because it began 
in July 2000, eight months before the 
recession began.
On Labor Day 2003 President Bush 
called for the creation of a new position 
of Assistant Secretary for Manufacturing in 
the Department of Commerce.The National
Association of Manufacturers has called for 
a new strategy for renewal of U.S. manufac-
turing, referring to the sector as being in
“jeopardy.” Congress is even considering 
legislation, such as the American Jobs
Creation Act (H.R. 2896), that would 
lower the corporate income tax rate 
for the nation’s manufacturing sector.
Treasury Secretary Snow has succeeded in
reversing long-standing U.S. exchange 
rate policy, calling for “flexibility” of Chinese
and Japanese exchange rates. Notice that the
focus is on two countries where he believes
that flexibility would lead to a lower value
of the dollar (and not, for example, Hong
Kong, where it would not).The new U.S.
policy has succeeded in pushing down 
the dollar sharply against the currencies 
of nearly all our major trading partners.
The administration has certainly been
responsive to manufacturers’ concerns,
notably by imposing steel tariffs despite the
evidence that they hurt U.S. manufacturing
and employment overall. Duesterberg
(2003) provides a long list of factors that
have contributed to “industrial decline,”
including Japanese and Chinese currency
manipulation and relatively high taxes.
The political and economic policy 
situation is becoming critical. In the 1980s,
the “deindustrialization” of America and the
hollowing out of the American corporation
supposedly threatened to turn us into a
nation of hamburger flippers and promised
a Day of Reckoning.1 The irony was that
manufacturing and the economy as a whole
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1 The view that the U.S. was losing its competitive advantage and that the manufacturing sector was in permanent
decline or disappearing was popular in the 1980s. See Marris (1985), Cline (1986) and Peterson (1987) for some
earlier examples. NAM (2003) and Duesterberg (2003) provide updated reincarnations of these earlier claims.
Strauss (2003) points out many of the recent claims’ shortcomings.
2were enjoying a surge of policy-induced eco-
nomic growth that had not been seen for two
decades and that was restoring some faith in the
continuing promise of the American Dream.
Nevertheless, the 1990–91 recession and subse-
quent jobless recovery led to a drumbeat for
“America First” and calls to “Rebuild America.”
Along the way there were numerous policy
errors and setbacks to the private economy, but
the economy nevertheless survived.There were
many changes, including a change of parties in
the White House, and major tax increases, but 
little came of threats to the corporate structure
or from threats to nationalize the nation’s 
infrastructure or its medical sector.
Pundits are always looking for a new whipping
boy to symbolize U.S. economic decline. In 
the mid-1980s it was the “deindustrialization”
of America reflected in the massive current
account deficit.When the deficit disappeared 
in the early 1990s, attention shifted to the 
recession and its subsequent “jobless recovery.”
But that too was sent packing in 1992 as the
economic expansion accelerated.
But this time things could get nastier. A 
large current account deficit is back and has
remained in the face of another jobless recovery,
i.e., an economic expansion without a recovery
in employment. And the decline in overall
employment is heavily concentrated in
manufacturing sector job losses. A more patient
and optimistic perspective could be offered by
reflecting on the euphoria of the new economy
with its rapid productivity growth, advances that
appear to be continuing. But instead, memories
of recent boom times have apparently simply
reinforced concerns about the demise of U.S.
manufacturing. As a result, the rhetoric of indus-
trial decline and political intervention to protect
industry and jobs is growing.
Has there been a structural shift in the U.S.
economy that has doomed the manufacturing
sector? Are government policies necessary for
renewal? This paper attempts to provide some
perspective on the decline in manufacturing
employment and whether it represents a 
fundamental structural shift that requires 
public policy assistance to halt and/or 
reverse. It also assesses some potential 
policy efforts to aid the sector and the 
outlook for manufacturing employment.
I. How Severe Are the Losses in
Manufacturing Employment?
A loss of 2.8 million jobs in manufacturing 
that continues for 39 months is huge by any
standard. For example, it is a loss of 16 percent
of such employment since its peak. But does 
it represent a fundamental break with past
trends and presage the death of the sector?
Chart 1 shows manufacturing employment in
millions of jobs and as a percentage of total 
non-farm payroll employment since 1947.
Three points stand out.
First, the recent decline in manufacturing
employment, while relatively large, should be
considered against the backdrop of secular
decline since the late 1970s and little growth
throughout the post-World War II period. This
sector has not offered expansive employment
opportunities since the late 1940s except for 
a brief growth spurt in the 1960s.
Secondly, as a share of overall payroll employ-
ment, manufacturing employment has been
declining throughout the period since 1947,
falling from almost one-third of the labor force
in 1947 to about 11.2 percent at the end of
2002. So this is not a sector where expansive
employment gains can be expected under the
best of conditions.
The third point to note is that manufacturing 
is cyclical. In fact the swings in employment 
visible in both measures in Chart 1 are closely
related to the business cycle.The latest case 
is no exception, as much of the decline in 
manufacturing employment, 1.1 million jobs,
occurred in the eight months of recession 
from the business cycle peak in March 2001 
to the cycle trough in November 2001.
But the recession ended two years ago and 
manufacturing employment has continued to
decline. Is this a break from the past? Actually 
it is not.While the number of jobs lost and the
length of the period of decline are unusual, the
pattern is not unprecedented.
Table 1 indicates the peaks and troughs of 
manufacturing employment before, during and
after the past ten recessions. It is quite common
for manufacturing employment to reach a peak
and begin falling before the actual onset of its
associated recession. In only two of the nine
3Chart 1
Manufacturing Has Not Been a Growth Engine for Employment in over Fifty Years
Calendar Years 1947–2003
previous cases did this not occur. It is also 
not unusual for manufacturing employment 
to continue falling after a recession was over.
This occurred in two-thirds of the previous
recessions. Clearly the latest experience is more
extreme and only one recession, the previous
one in 1990–91, appears to rival the length of
time that manufacturing employment declined
before and after the recession. In that recession,
however, manufacturing employment fell for 
16 months prior to the onset of recession, twice
as long as in the recent case. Manufacturing
employment also declined for a long time 
following the previous recession, falling for 
19 months after the recession ended, not much
less than the current decline that reached 26
months through January 2004. Closer inspection
of the previous two recessions reveals similar
developments. During the year between the
1980 and 1981–82 recessions, manufacturing
employment only partially recovered, not 
reaching its June 1979 peak before the next
recession began.When the two periods are 
combined, as in the last row of Table 1, the 
42 months of decline were the same as in the
latest case (at least through January 2004).
The table also shows the length of decline of
manufacturing employment from its own peak 
to its own trough surrounding each recession.
The latest case, at 42 months so far, rivals the 
last when such employment fell for 43 months
and the previous combined case of 42 months,
but exceeds the average of the previous postwar
recessions.To provide some perspective on the
size of recent cyclical decline in employment, the
last two columns in the table show the size of
the peak-to-trough decline in payroll employment
and in manufacturing employment around each
recession. Note that the terms peak and trough
again refer to those for the respective employ-
ment measure, not the business cycle dates.
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The recent recession experience was relatively
mild judged by its length (eight months versus
an average of 11 for earlier recessions) and by
the size of the associated decline in payroll
employment.The latter was slightly worse 
than that in the 1990–91 recession, but only a
little more than half that in the eight previous
recessions.
The decline in manufacturing employment in
the latest recession was almost twice as large 
as earlier, however. It also appears that the 
cyclical decline in manufacturing employment
has become relatively larger compared with 
the decline in overall payroll employment.
In the first eight recessions in the table, the
decline in manufacturing was a little less than
three times as large as for payroll employment
in total, but in each of the last two recessions
this multiple has exceeded five times as large.
Chart 1 and Table 1 show that there was a 
large decline in manufacturing employment
around the 1990–91 recession and that an 
earlier decline associated with the 1980 and
1981–82 recession is comparable, though it was
interrupted by a temporary cyclical recovery. In
particular, the decline in the 42 months ending
in January 2004 was 3.0 million jobs, or 17.5
percent. In the earlier comparable period,
June 1979 to December 1982, the decline in
manufacturing employment was 2.9 million 
jobs or 14.6 percent.2 One would have to 
go back to World War II to find a comparable
decline. In the 27 months ending in February
1946 manufacturing employment fell 3.0 million
or 20.4 percent.While not unprecedented, and
certainly largely related to a deteriorating 
relationship of manufacturing employment 
to the business cycle, the recent decline 
does stand out.
The principal reason for the decline in manufac-
turing employment is unusually rapid productiv-
ity growth.This is explained below, but Table 2
shows that the productivity advances in the past
two recessions far exceeded the average gain 
or any individual past gain.That is why both
recessions were mild in terms of output losses,
but not in terms of the decline in manufacturing
employment. Indeed, in the 1990–91 case,
manufacturing output had actually risen 
somewhat over the period. Even in the full
1979–82 period, shown in the last row,
productivity rose during the downturn in 
manufacturing employment, something that 
had not occurred since the late-1940’s recession.
4
2 This period gave rise to the earlier deluge of claims that the manufacturing jobs and the sector itself were in permanent
decline. On the earlier decline see Tatom (1986).
11/48 – 10/49 11 2 1 14 – 5.2% – 10.8%
7/53 – 5/54 10 0 3 13 – 3.4 – 9.7
8/57 – 4/58 8 6 2 16 – 4.4 – 9.9
4/60 – 2/61 10 2 0 12 – 2.3 – 6.1
12/69 – 11/70 11 4 0 15 – 1.2 – 9.3
11/73 – 3/75 16 – 1 4 19 – 2.8% – 11.4%
1/80 – 7/80 6 7 0 13 – 1.3 – 6.5
7/81 – 11/82 16 1 1 18 – 3.3 – 10.9
7/90 – 3/91 8 16 19 43 – 1.5 – 7.3
3/01 – 11/01 8 8 26 42 – 2.1 – 17.5
Average 1948 – 1982 11 2.6 1.4 15 – 3.0% – 9.3%
Combined 1/80 – 11/82 34 7 1 42 – 2.9 – 14.6
Business Cycle 
Contractions
Table 1
Manufacturing Employment Cycles Are Lengthening
Additional Months of 
Decline in Manufacturing
Employment
Peak to
Trough
Number of
Months
Months Before
the Business
Cycle Peak
Months After
the Business
Cycle Trough
Total 
Months of
Manufacturing
Employment
Decline
Percentage
Decline in
Payroll
Employment
Percentage
Decline in
Manufacturing
Employment
511/48 – 10/49 – 10.8% – 6.9% + 4.2%
7/53 – 5/54 – 9.7 – 9.8 – 0.1
8/57 – 4/58 – 9.9 – 10.9 – 1.1
4/60 – 2/61 – 6.1 – 9.2 – 3.3
12/69 – 11/70 – 9.3 – 10.0 – 0.8
11/73 – 3/75 – 11.4% – 13.1% – 1.9%
1/80 – 7/80 – 6.5 – 8.3 – 1.9
7/81 – 11/82 – 10.9 – 8.8 + 2.4
7/80 – 3/91 – 7.3 + 3.0 + 11.1
3/01 – 11/01 – 16.0 – 4.6 + 13.6
Average 1948 – 1982 – 9.3% – 9.6% – 0.3%
Combined 1/80 – 11/82 – 14.6 – 11.1 + 4.1
Business Cycle
Peak–Cycle
Trough
Table 2
Unusual Productivity Growth Explains the Large Cyclical Decline in Employment
1948–2001
(a) See Footnote 1
Source: Tax Foundation
Percentage Decline
in Manufacturing
Employment
Percentage Decline
in Manufacturing
Output
Productivity
Increase
Is the Decline Due to Measurement Error?
Before exploring the changing cyclical 
performance of manufacturing further, it 
is important to point out another potential
explanation for some of the apparent height-
ened cyclical sensitivity, measurement error.
At least for payroll employment, estimated in 
the same survey as manufacturing employment,
there is a strong argument that employment 
loss measures are biased upward surrounding
recessions.The reason is that in recessions and
afterwards an unusually large number of new
small companies are formed that are not picked
up in the monthly survey. Thus employment 
in new small firms in not picked up in small
firms until quite some time after a recession 
has ended.
For example, following the 1990–91 recession that
ended in March 1991, payroll employment losses
were substantially over-estimated and the period
of decline was thought to be much longer than is
now known to have been the case. Data revisions
released in June 1992 put the estimated decline 
in payroll employment at 2.2 million jobs and
showed that employment had declined for 18
months, falling from June 1990 until January 1992.
These estimates remained in place for the next
year and only later was the loss put at 1.6 million
and the period of decline was found to have been
half as long, ending in May 1991, shortly after the
March recession end. Many analysts are expecting
comparable revisions in the future.Will today’s
estimates of 2.8 million job losses eventually be
cut by 20 percent and the length of the decline
cut in half and moved back to May 2002? 
Measured Job Loss Is Not a Measure of the
Nation’s Unemployment
Another related issue is that payroll and 
manufacturing employment data do not 
reflect the extent of unemployment.These 
data measure jobs in the non-farm payroll sector.
Thus they exclude farm employment and the
large number of self-employed who are not 
on payrolls, including small business owners,
newly created firms  and consultants. But the
inaccuracy of job loss figures is not due only to
what they miss; they also double-count multiple
jobholders whose employment is more cyclical
than the employment of single job holders.
Civilian employment, the estimated number 
of employed in the whole civilian economy
adjusted for breaks in the series, is currently
above its peak in January 2001, two months
before the business cycle peak. Actually it fell
for only 12 months, not the 29 months that 
payroll employment declined, with the decline
ending two months after the business cycle
trough. It has rebounded by 2.7 million people
working over the past 24 months, not fallen 
as the payroll and manufacturing employment 
data suggests.
II. The New Economy and the
Changing U.S. Business Cycle
While the recent decline in manufacturing
employment fits the secular and cyclical 
patterns of the past and is not unprecedented,
the size and length of the recent decline is
severe, rivaling the worst cyclical decline since
Chart 2
Manufacturing Capacity Is Dominated by the High-Tech Sector
Calendar Years 1968–2002
World War II.Yet the recent recession is not 
usually regarded as especially severe, judging 
by its length, the decline in overall output or
even the size of the overall decline in payroll
employment. So something does seem at least
qualitatively different and not just in the recent
experience.The 1990–91 recession shared 
many of the same features of manufacturing 
employment decline.What is different is the
New Economy and in particular the dramatic
growth of the high-tech sector. This has made
the whole manufacturing sector, the center of
business cycle activity in the past, more cyclical
than it has ever been.While the frequency of
U.S. recessions, and sometimes their length and
severity, have declined, the manufacturing sector
itself has become more cyclically sensitive than
before 1990 and this has been reflected in
longer swings in manufacturing employment.
Chart 2 shows the growth rate of manufacturing
capacity including and excluding the high-tech
sector: computers, semiconductors and commu-
nication equipment.The latter series begins in
1968.The large and growing gap between the
total series and that excluding the high-tech 
sector shows the increasing relative importance
and much more rapid growth of the high-tech
sector. In 2002 both measures are quite 
comparable to their performance in 1983,
a period when manufacturing employment
growth had been as weak as recently. From 
1995 to 1998, however manufacturing capacity
grew rapidly, whether the high-tech sector is
included or not.
Chart 3 shows comparable figures for output
growth.The rapid pace of growth in high-tech
output stands out.The growth rates are higher
in the late 1990s, but they have been high since
the late 1960s (earliest available data), especially
high in the 1970s and 1980s. So the New
Economy is not really so new. The chart also
shows that high-tech output, while highly 
correlated with the rest of manufacturing 
output, is much more cyclical, as its growth 
rate swings are larger than the changes in 
the growth rate excluding this sector.
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The greater cyclical volatility and increasing 
size of the high-tech sector have increased the
cyclical sensitivity of the manufacturing sector,
and this could account for the larger and longer
cycles of manufacturing employment than were
the case earlier.3
The decline in high-tech output growth in 
2001–02 is large, so it is not surprising that
employment in this sector should also have
declined unusually. From the peak of payroll
employment in January 2001 to October,
employment in the comparable sector called
computers and electronic equipment by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, fell from 1.874 
million workers to 1.379, or 495 thousand 
(26.4 percent).This decline directly accounts 
for almost 20 percent of the decline in payroll
employment over the period. In the 1990–91
recession high-tech output growth fell in half
compared with the pre-recession pace.
Employment data for this sector begin in
January 1990, but from that point until its
trough in September 1993, long after the 
March 1991 business cycle trough, employment
fell by 298 thousand jobs (15.3 percent) to
1.643 million. So there were parallels in terms 
of the very large declines in employment and
capacity growth in the sector as well as the
length of time necessary for employment to
reach a trough and begin to recover.
Chart 3
High-Tech Output is More Cyclical than the Rest of Manufacturing
Calendar Years 1968–2002
3A regression of the logarithm of the high-tech capacity utilization rate on that for manufacturing excluding high-tech shows
that the elasticity of the former is 1.3, using annual data for 1967–2002.This implies that a 10 percent decline in manufactur-
ing output and capacity utilization in manufacturing or the total excluding the high-tech sector, until recently about the
same, would reduce high-tech output and utilization by relatively more, about 13 percent.
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III. The Proximate Reasons for the
Secular Decline in Manufacturing
Employment
The principal factors behind the secular 
stagnation of manufacturing employment are
the relatively rapid productivity growth in the
sector and the unwillingness of purchasers to
buy the increasingly abundant and cheap output
of the manufacturing sector.4 Chart 4 shows 
the faster growth of manufacturing productivity
compared with that for the overall business 
sector. Productivity growth in manufacturing is
generally faster, though more cyclical, and both
features are especially pronounced since 1996.
The effects of such rapid productivity growth
are to boost supply and depress prices. As the
relative prices of manufactured goods fall, the
incentive to expand production is diminished
somewhat, though relative price reductions are
necessary to induce purchasers to buy more.
There may also be some tendency for producers
to bid up the wages or costs of other resources
to take advantage of the profit potential offered
by productivity advances and that too would
limit output and employment expansion.
Chart 5 shows some of the proximate causes 
of the relative decline in manufacturing 
employment as a share of business sector
employment for the period 1949 to 2002 
(nearly the same downward trend shown 
in Chart 1). Relative productivity, the ratio 
of manufacturing productivity to business 
sector productivity, and relative prices, the 
ratio of the implicit price deflators, are 
shown along with the ratio of hourly 
wages in the two sectors. Data on prices 
are not available after 2000.These factors are
important in understanding manufacturing
employment because they affect the incentive
of employers to demand workers.
8
Chart 4
Manufacturing Productivity Growth Was Unusually Rapid from 1994 to 2000
Calendar Years 1952–2002
4 The economic theory used in this section, and an earlier application to manufacturing, can be found in Tatom (1987).
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9Chart 5
Relative Manufacturing Productivity, Prices, Wages and Output
Calendar Years 1949–2002
Suppose for example that productivity 
in manufacturing rises 10 percent.This 
reduces unit labor cost or the marginal cost 
of production by 10 percent while allowing
unchanged employment to produce 10 percent
greater output. For the sake of the argument,
suppose that competition among producers
pushes prices down by 10 percent (or pushes
up relative wages by 10 percent).Then produc-
ers’ incentives to hire more workers and 
produce even more manufactured goods are
neutralized. But they are still attempting 
to produce and sell 10 percent more output 
at 10 percent lower prices. If purchasers are
unwilling to buy this much more output at 
these lower prices, employment in manufactur-
ing declines and employment elsewhere goes 
up as well.This is a simple version of how 
faster productivity growth in manufacturing 
reallocates employment and real income 
gains across the rest of the economy.
Productivity growth accelerated in manufactur-
ing relative to the overall business sector 
beginning in 1981 and this accelerated growth
continues at least until 2000.This faster 
productivity growth was reflected in a decline
in the relative price of manufactured goods.
Moreover, since purchasers of manufactured
goods did not expand the share of output they
purchased, manufacturers reduced their relative
share of employment. From 1981 to 2000,
the relative price fell 25.7 percent, leading 
to a comparable reduction in the share of
employment.This accounts for the lion’s 
share (74% of the decline from 25.4% of 
business sector employment in manufacturing
to 18.8 percent in 2000).The rest of the 
decline is due to a slight shrinkage in the 
share of output in manufacturing due to relative
demand differences.The share of manufacturing
output declined slightly over time, but mostly
before the early 1980s.There was a cyclical
decline in 2000–02 that contributed to the fall 
in the share of manufacturing employment,
however.While there has been some erosion 
in the premium paid to manufacturing workers
over the years, it has not played a major role 
in boosting manufacturing employment.
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These manufacturing phenomena describe 
the well known and quite similar story of 
agricultural development. Since the nineteenth
century, productivity growth in agriculture has
dominated productivity growth in developed
countries. In the 20th century, male employment
in “primary occupations,” (farmers, fishermen,
forestry workers, miners, and others, but mainly
agriculture), fell from 42 percent of the total
male employment in 1900 to 4 percent in
1998.5 The number of farm operators fell from
5.7 million in 1900 and about 6.5 million at the
peak in 1920 to 1.9 million by 1997, one-third
the number at the beginning of the century.
Nevertheless, the population rose from 
76 million in 1900 to 275 million by 2000.
And agricultural output kept pace, producing
huge net exports by the end of the century.
The reason that agricultural employment
declined is that agricultural productivity 
outstripped productivity growth in other 
sectors and consumers were unwilling to 
spend the gains in their real income on food 
and fiber. Instead they demanded other goods
and services so that consumers had more food 
as well as other goods and services.To do 
so, resources had to move out of the very 
productive agricultural sector.This story 
applies as well, though with less force, to 
the manufacturing sector, especially since 
World War II. And it is not simply a U.S. story.
IV. The Secular Weakness in
Manufacturing Employment is not
Restricted to the U.S.
Manufacturing employment has been declining
in all developed countries for many years, not
just in the U.S. Table 3 shows the declines since
1979 expressed as an annual rate of growth, but
it also shows the cumulative decline from each
country’s peak level to the level of employment
in 2002 along with the date of this previous
peak level.6 The annual rate of decline since
1979 is smaller in the U.S. than in the U.K.,
Sweden, France and Belgium and slightly larger
than most of the others. Only Canada shows a
rise in employment on both bases, but this hides
the volatility of the sector because Canadian
manufacturing employment was only slightly
above its 1989 peak in 2000–02 and was lower
in every other year in between. Similarly its
1989 peak and 1988 level were only slightly
above the previous 1979 peak and employment
was again lower in every year in between.7
The decline in the U.S. since its peak is actually
smaller than that in all the other developed
countries except Italy, which is only slightly
smaller, and in Canada. Even South Korea and
Taiwan showed declines in manufacturing
employment since 1990 (not shown).These
declines were not caused by the Asian financial
crisis in 1997–98.Taiwan’s peak level of employ-
ment occurred in 1988 and Korea’s occurred in
5 See Caplow, Hicks, and Wattenberg (2001).
6 See the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2002).This release covers the countries in Table 3 and South Korea and Taiwan.
7 Carson (2003) has pointed to a decline in manufacturing employment in 20 countries since 1995. But this decline predates
1995 and is a secular phenomenon that began much earlier in most developed countries.
U.S. – 1.1% – 21.8% (1979)
Canada + 0.2% + 5.0% (1989)
Japan – 0.7% – 25.5% (1992)
Belgium – 1.5% – 42.8% (1970)
Denmark – 0.7% – 29.8% (1970)
France – 1.4% – 32.3% (1974)
Germany – 1.0% – 27.0% (1965)
Italy – 1.0% – 20.1% (1980)
Netherlands – 0.8% – 20.1% (1965)
Norway – 0.8% – 24.8% (1974)
Sweden – 1.4% – 32.9% (1970)
U.K. – 2.7% – 54.6% (1966)
Country
Table 3
Manufacturing Employment Has Declined in Most Industrial Countries
** West German data end in 1998
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
1979–02 
compound
annual rate
Change from
Peak to 2002
(peak year) Country
1979–02 
compound
annual rate
Change from
Peak to 2002
(peak year)
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1989. In Taiwan employment fell at a 0.5 percent
rate from 1990 to 2002 (14.4 percent since its
peak) and in South Korea the rate of decline 
was 1.0 percent for the same period 
(11.7 percent since its peak).
Of the developed countries in Table 3,
manufacturing output rose the fastest from 
1979 to 2002 in Sweden (3.4% per year), Japan
(2.5% per year), Canada and the U.S. (2.4% per
year). It rose even faster in the Tiger countries 
of Taiwan and South Korea. Except for Sweden,
U.S. output growth nearly matched or exceeded
that of all 12 developed countries.The eight
slower-growing countries ranged from Belgium,
France and Netherlands, about 2 percent per
year, down to Germany, Italy and the U.K. with
growth rates of 0.6 percent per year or less.
For a mature economy with the highest overall
output per capita among developed countries,
it is impressive that the U.S. performs more 
like an emerging market, with relatively rapid
growth even in its manufacturing sector.
V. Comparative U.S. Manufacturing
Performance – Is There a Case for
Policy Intervention?
While the cyclical performance of 
manufacturing remains weak, policy-makers
must keep in mind that this does not detract
from the outstanding performance of the 
sector compared to other developed nations.
As the data above indicate, U.S. manufacturing
output has grown faster since 1979 than in most
developed countries and since 1990 faster than
in some emerging markets. Nevertheless some
industry spokesmen and some policy-makers
have insisted that the U.S. is losing out to 
foreign competitors and policy retaliation is 
necessary. Industry spokesmen can be forgiven
for pursuing favorable intervention on their 
own behalf, regardless of circumstances. But
there is no basis for the idea that international
competition is damaging U.S. manufacturing 
output or employment.
One version of this view is that a rising value of
the dollar reduces U.S. competitiveness, slowing
U.S. growth and boosting that abroad. But usually
when the value of the dollar rises, it reflects a 
policy shock such as a tax cut or anti-inflation 
policy that is expected to boost U.S. investment
and productivity or a favorable productivity
shock.8 In either case, productivity and output
should accelerate following an exchange rate
appreciation, and the reverse should be the 
case abroad.
Table 4 assesses whether large movements 
in the value of the dollar have impaired 
U.S. manufacturing growth and benefited 
U.S. competitors. It shows the annual rate of
increase of the real value of the U.S. dollar for
various periods since 1960.9 It also shows the
growth rate of industrial production for the 
1960 – 73 — + 5.2 + 6.5 —
1973 – 80 – 1.3 + 1.4 + 1.9 —
1980 – 95 + 6.4 + 1.6 + 1.6 + 0.7
1985 – 90 – 5.5 + 2.4 + 3.4 + 3.0
1990 – 96 – 0.6 + 3.1 + 0.8 + 0.7
1996 – 00 + 4.2 + 5.5 + 3.1 + 3.5
2000 – 02 + 3.0 – 2.1 – 1.6 – 0.4
Period
Table 4
A Higher Value of the Dollar Reflects Relative Gains in U.S. Manufacturing, Not Lost Competitiveness
Average Annual Growth Rates, 1960–2002
Source: Based on OECD data
Real
Exchange
Rate
U.S.
Industrial
Production
Rest-of-OECD
Industrial
Production
EU-15
Industrial
Production
8 See Tatom (1987), (1988) and (1995). Glick and Hutchison (1990) argue that fiscal stimulus could account for strong manu-
facturing output in 1980–85, when the dollar rose sharply.
9 The value of the dollar series is the broad measure, price-adjusted trade-weighted exchange rate measured by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
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U.S. and for the 23 other members of the OECD
(Rest-of-OECD or R-OECD). After 1976 the 
table includes the growth rate for output in 
the fifteen countries of the European Union 
(EU-15). Data come from the OECD.
U.S. manufacturing output has outperformed 
R-OECD since the 1970s. For example, for the
whole period used above, 1979–02, U.S. growth
annually averaged a 2.3 percent rate, more than
one-third faster than the 1.7 percent R-OECD
rate and nearly 50 percent faster than the 1.6
percent growth rate for the EU-15. In the early
period when nominal exchange rates were
fixed, R-OECD grew faster, reflecting the 
expected convergence of poorer OECD 
countries with the more productive and higher
income U.S. The oil price shock in 1973–74 
lowered productivity in the U.S. and elsewhere,
but the slowing was larger abroad. During this 
period the dollar generally fell reflecting the
breakdown of the earlier fixed-exchange rate
system and the fall of the over-valued dollar.
In 1980–85, the dollar rose rapidly. Nevertheless
U.S. output accelerated and output growth in 
R-OECD actually slowed.This is contrary to the
expectation of those who believe that the rise 
in the dollar should boost output growth abroad
and slow it in the U.S. Subsequently when the
dollar fell sharply, the U.S. output accelerated,
but not as much as R-OECD.This is the only
period when the rest of the OECD grew faster
than the U.S. after 1980, but the values of 
currencies abroad were appreciating rapidly.
The period from 1980 to 1985 saw the value of
the U.S. dollar climb sharply while many analysts
claimed the higher dollar was destroying the
competitiveness of U.S. manufacturing.If propo-
nents of the view that a falling dollar is good 
for the manufacturing sector were correct, then
R-OECD output growth should have slowed
between 1980 and 1985, but it did not. It rose
and by more than output growth in the U.S.
In the 1990-96 period the dollar changed little.
While foreign currencies stopped appreciating
so rapidly, output growth slowed.The pace 
of decline of the dollar slowed to near zero,
but output growth accelerated. Finally when 
the value of the dollar began to rise rapidly 
in 1996–2000, U.S. manufacturing growth 
accelerated and growth in R-OECD slowed
sharply, despite rapidly declining currencies.
All of these episodes suggest that advocates of 
a weak dollar are incorrect. Instead, as explained
above, a rising dollar tends to reflect changes
that would lead one to anticipate accelerated
growth in the U.S. and slower growth abroad.
Even between 2000 and 2002 when U.S. output
did slow, R-OECD growth slowed as well, though
by less than in the U.S. One example that is
roughly consistent may be reassuring, but it 
is likely that this brief period is dominated in
both regions by the global recession and a 
flight to the dollar as a safe haven.
Driving down the dollar is not a prescription to
boost U.S. manufacturing.The policies necessary
to push down the dollar, such as inflationary
monetary policies or fiscal policies that lower
the rate of return to U.S. investment can lower
the dollar, but they reduce U.S. competitiveness,
at least as indicated by the U.S. share of output.
Another more direct version of the 
competitiveness story is that rising imports
reflect the shifting of U.S. jobs abroad. Even 
if this were true, it would not make a case for
policy intervention.Americans gain by acquiring
cheap imports, if in fact they are cheap, and the
gains from trade more than offset any losses due
to disruptions in U.S. resource allocation and
employment. But the basic premise that jobs are
lost due to foreign competition is weak as well.
Chart 6 shows U.S. manufacturing output, and
real exports and imports on a national income
and product accounts basis (1996 prices) 
since 1979.10 The chart suggests that imports
have played little role, overall, in declining 
manufacturing output. Manufacturing output
began to decline in the second quarter of 2000,
one quarter earlier than the peak in imports and
exports and nearly a year before the business
cycle peak. Since then imports have changed
very little, first declining as the economy fell
into recession and then rising slightly. Overall,
real imports were consistently lower than they
were in the third quarter of 2000 until the 
second quarter of 2003. In that quarter they 
rose to about 1.5 percent more than their 
previous peak almost three years earlier. Even
then imports were only about $23.1 billion
(1996 prices) higher, or less than one percent 
of recent manufacturing output.
The trade weakness that has contributed to the
rising current account deficit is on the export
side. Since their earlier peak when imports also
peaked, exports have declined about $90 billion
10 The data are quarterly, so the label “January 1979” refers to the first quarter of the year.
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(1996 prices), or 9.4 percent. Some would blame
this on the rise in the value of the dollar over 
the period and others would point to the global 
recession since 2001. In any event, few countries
gained at the expense of the U.S. as the rest of the
world’s output and imports have been extremely
weak.The large gap between imports and exports
opened up from the first quarter of 1998 until
mid-2000 when manufacturing output peaked.
Since then exports have declined while imports
kept pace with the growth of U.S. real GDP.
Imports rose at a 1.6 percent annual rate over
these three years, not much faster than that of 
real GDP (1.5 percent).
The Policy Outlook
Despite evidence that trade and the value of 
the dollar have not impaired U.S. manufacturing,
including employment, there are strong interest
groups who wish to use the secular decline in
manufacturing employment and the aftermath
of the cyclical decline to back their case for
favorable policy support.The view that Japan
and China have pushed up the value of the 
dollar, creating essentially a tax on U.S. exports
and subsidizing our imports, has gained wide
support.This is ironic because China has not
changed its exchange rate in nine years, while
experts have argued the necessity of a Japanese
depreciation for many years.
An appreciation of the yen could halt the 
budding expansion in Japan and throw the
country back into recession.This would again 
be a setback to Japanese demand for U.S. goods
and services. It is most unlikely that Japan will
allow a sustained appreciation driven by specu-
lative demand for Japanese assets, especially if 
it jeopardizes the expansion. But Japan has a 
history of smoothing exchange rate fluctuations,
not stopping them.When the current rush 
to Japanese assets and yen dies away, many 
currency analysts expect the yen to resume 
its depreciation, which Japan could accomplish
either through outright declines or by maintain-
ing lower inflation than their trading partners.
Either way, or through some combination of the
Chart 6
The Decline in Manufacturing Output Was Not Associated with a Rise in Imports
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two, the yen will continue to depreciate. Even if
these analysts are wrong and the yen is already
near its long-term equilibrium level, it is not 
likely that the yen will appreciate very much.
Appreciation is driven by the growth surge 
and higher expected returns. Once the cyclical
surge encounters capacity constraints, which
could happen quickly, any tendency for yen
appreciation will end.
The Chinese have strong currency controls, a
successful fixed exchange rate system and very
weak financial institutions.Their unsustainable
cyclical expansion is attracting record capital
inflows and a build-up of dollar currency
reserves, but appreciating the currency or 
raising its peg would create expectations of 
further appreciation.And this would exacerbate
the inflows and reserve appreciation. In 1999
when the aftermath of the Asian currency 
crisis was making it difficult for the Chinese to
achieve the dollar reserve build-up they desired,
capital controls were severely tightened on the
ability of Chinese to acquire assets abroad. If
capital inflows become excessive (by Chinese
standards), some relaxation of capital controls
can be expected, not currency appreciation.
The Chinese have a long way to go to create
viable financial institutions that could survive 
in an internationally competitive environment.
Maintaining fixed exchange rates and capital
controls insulates these weak institutions,
reducing their incentives for reform, but the
reform agenda is in the hands of the govern-
ment, not the banks. One thing is clear about
Chinese policy-makers, however.They will 
not allow external forces to pressure them 
into accelerating reform. Since U.S. pressures 
on China began in earnest in September, the
Chinese have halted planned steps to open 
capital markets and they have made clear that
they will not be rushed in altering exchange 
rate policy or reforming financial institutions.
Perhaps the most egregious problem with 
the view that foreign governments are forcing
up the dollar, and that this is hurting U.S.
manufacturing, is that such a dollar appreciation
would benefit the industry, not hurt it. Pushing
down a foreign currency requires policies that
destroy investment and productivity, such as
inflationary monetary policies, costly regula-
tions, or increases in tax rates.These actions
hurt domestic industry and benefit foreign 
competitors. In Tatom (1995), for example,
the effect of a nominal dollar appreciation 
on the rest of OECD manufacturing output 
was shown to be strongly negative. Similar 
work on individual countries finds that a 
country’s currency value is positively related 
to its growth, contrary to the mantra of 
manufacturing trade groups. Notwithstanding
the upcoming political season, the pressure on
countries to push down the dollar is likely to
diminish, because the dollar has already fallen
about 10 percent in the eighteen months ending
in October 2003 and was close to its long-term
average value.This decline occurred before
recent efforts to drive the dollar down 
through political pressures. Other currencies 
are beginning to appear to be over-valued.
Another view that is frequently heard today 
is that manufacturers are at a competitive 
disadvantage internationally because of high 
U.S. taxes.The repeal of tax breaks on foreign
corporate income, mandated by the WTO, will
raise taxes on international firms, reinforcing
this view and providing tax revenue that could
be used for tax relief. The America Job Creation
Act and similar proposals intend to provide 
such relief. But these proposals are short on
incentives for new production and employment
and they are discriminatory, favoring capital
employed by manufacturers and not in the 
rest of the economy.
Tax discrimination is wasteful; it will discourage
investment in the rest of the economy as it
increases incentives to the manufacturing sector.
Moreover, it is not even supportable by credible
arguments that the manufacturing sector is in
need of special support. Some new tax relief for
manufacturing is likely. It is unfortunate that the
opportunity to reduce taxes may not be used to
provide as many new incentives to expand the
nation’s output, real wages and employment as
possible. Special tax handouts almost invariably
reduce economic efficiency in the affected 
sector. Manufacturing is not in decline in the
U.S., but with enough grants from the U.S.
taxpayer, it could lose its strong international
competitive position.
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VI. Conclusion 
Manufacturing employment has declined 
over the past three years, reinforcing concerns
about the overall weakness of the economy 
and support for economic policies to aid the
manufacturing sector.The situation has become
reminiscent of the argument in the 1980s that
the U.S. was losing its industrial base, in part 
due to the budget and current account deficits
and the strong value of the U.S. dollar. Most 
of those arguments and warnings proved false,
as manufacturing output strengthened and 
outperformed major U.S. competitors.The 
current account deficit and budget deficits 
went away and there was no obvious adverse
impact on manufacturing at the end of the 
day.The recent decline in manufacturing
employment has brought back these old 
arguments.The emergence of the budget 
deficit, the continuation of current account
deficits and, until early 2002, the relatively 
high value of the U.S. dollar have reinforced 
concern.
Manufacturing employment has declined 
for both secular and cyclical reasons.The 
benchmark for employment performance 
is declining employment because of rapid 
technological change. Against this benchmark,
employment has declined for normal cyclical
reasons.The decline is somewhat larger and 
has lasted longer than around past cyclical
downturns, but similar declines, especially 
in the last recession suggest that this is not 
some new phenomenon threatening the 
existence of the manufacturing sector.
What does seem to be different is that the 
high-tech sector in manufacturing has grown 
to a size that its cyclical features are coming 
to dominate the manufacturing cycle.The most
important features of the high-tech sector in 
this regard are its greater cyclical variation and
its longer employment cycle.This argument is
contingent on two observations, but the basis
for it is of longer standing.The high-tech sector
produces capital goods, especially equipment.
The growing importance of this sector means
that manufacturing is becoming more durable,
equipment oriented, and therefore more 
cyclical.Thus the relatively slow bottoming 
out of manufacturing employment, while 
undesirable is not a cause for policy concern,
at least not beyond the general concern for
whether the early years of the expansion 
have been unacceptably slow.
The decline in manufacturing employment 
has been larger and started earlier in most 
other developed countries. Moreover, U.S.
manufacturing output has grown rapidly 
compared to overall national output and 
it has expanded more rapidly than in other 
industrial countries at least since the late-1970s.
Thus it is hard to justify claims that U.S.
manufacturing is in need of special support.
The cyclical decline in manufacturing has 
not been associated with a rise in imports,
nor has U.S. manufacturing output been 
adversely affected, recently or in the 1980s,
by a strong dollar. Instead, in periods when 
the dollar has risen sharply, it has reflected
unusually rapid growth in U.S. manufacturing
due to economic policy changes or technical
change that increased the rate of return to
investment in the U.S. compared with returns
abroad.Viewed in this light, one is hard pressed
to conclude that manufacturing is in need of
life-support.
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